The Use of Mechanical Restraints in Psychiatric Hospitals
Elyn R. Saks t Julia, a newly admitted psychotic patient, suddenly breaks a plastic spoon while she is eating lunch. She appears amused, slightly fearful, and a touch defiant. Staff suggest that she needs to be restrained. When Julia resists, six orderlies converge on her, pin her to her bed, and, despite her struggles, cuff her limbs with thick leather straps. Finally, they immobilize her torso with a body net. Tied spread-eagle to the bed, unable to move, Julia is now in "six point" restraints. ' In time Julia's physical pain will increase. Her ankles and wrists will bruise, her body will ache from the forced immobility. Although she will beg for release (many patients do), Julia will neither be let go, nor be told when staff plan to untie her. Alone, frightened, and in pain, she will begin to struggle again-a signal to the staff that she needs to be restrained longer. 2 Julia was a patient in a well-staffed, highly regarded university hospital when this episode occurred. In most jurisdictions, she would not even have a colorable claim that any of her civil rights or liberties had been violated. Her case is by no means unique; in New York state, which has one of the most stringent and carefully written restraints statutes in the country, in a single month's time in 1984, nearly 500 patients were restrained in well over 1,100 incidents. 3 In fact, Julia was lucky, because she left the hospital unharmed. Between 1979 and 1982, nearly 30 psychi-atric patients died in New York state from being restrained or secluded." Ironically, what we allow to happen daily to hundreds of psychiatric patients, we, as a society, would not allow to happen to a person who had committed even the most heinous of crimes. 5 
I. A DEVIATION IN THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
Concern for the liberty and dignity of the members of our society permeates American jurisprudence. 6 Our legal system has spent much effort balancing these extremely personal and highly individual rights against other societal interests. The law's treatment of mechanical restraints deviates sharply from this legal landscape. Compared to the balance struck between other medical interests and patients' interests in liberty and dignity, the rules that govern restraints are disturbing anomalies.
Both the common law and statutes zealously safeguard the liberty and dard of living) are constitutionally insufficient to justify commitment. 1 2 Most states have gone even farther. They have forbidden commitment for the sake of any kind of treatment at all,' 3 and have limited it solely to those who are dangerous to themselves or others or who are gravely disabled. Only in these extreme circumstances are liberty and dignity violations believed to be justified.
Accordingly, substantial procedural protections accompany civil commitment to ensure that the infringement upon an individual's dignity and liberty is justified.' To determine whether patients meet the commitment criteria, most states entitle patients to a hearing:" 5 to notice, to a right to confront and cross examine witnesses, and to representation by counsel.'" Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that patients must be found to meet the commitment criteria by "clear and convincing" evidence. 17 Mandatory review procedures are common."
A substantial majority of states also apply a "least restrictive alternative" mandate to civil commitment, requiring that any infringement upon a patient's liberty must be the absolute minimum necessary to achieve the 12. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) . The Court did not reach the issue of whether treatment in general justifies commitment, id. at 573, but it did consider these particular alleged "treatment benefits." The court below had found that milieu therapy in this case was nothing more than confinement in the milieu of the hospital-not enough treatment to justify the patient's injuries. Id. at 569. And if treatment is a defense to commitment, then whether something is treatment is justiciable. Id. at 574 n.10. Moreover, the "mere presence of mental illness," the Court found, "does not disqualify a person from preferring his home to the comforts of an institution," id. at 575. The Court found a person's desire for freedom more important than the material gains provided by institutionalization.
13. As of 1974, only 17 states still allowed commitment based on the "need for treatment" alone. 14. But cf. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), which gives children fewer procedural protections than adults. Parham also seems to give doctors more authority, and to view commitment as more a medical decision, than did O'Connor v. Donaldson. But in Parham the determination that doctors are called on to make-that the child is mentally ill and could benefit from hospital treatment-is a medical determination, while the value-decision of whether the benefits of treatment are worth the detriments of hospitalization has already been made by the parents. The parents have decided that their child's being "in need of treatment" is a good enough reason for hospitalization.
15. As of 1974, only ten states used administrative, rather than judicial, hearings to make this determination (although some provided for judicial hearings as an alternative). See Developments supra note 13, at 1269 n.36. state's end. 19 These least restrictive alternative statutes are in keeping with the long-articulated principle that intrusion upon an individual's constitutional rights will be permitted only to the extent necessary to achieve another legitimate state interest. 2 One area, however, in which some courts and legislatures have been striking the balance in favor of the state interest has been the field of psychotropic medication. Patients' choices not to have psychotropic medication have been overridden in these jurisdictions not only in situations of danger, but also when the treatment-benefits have been deemed great enough, 2 1 such as when there are no other less intrusive ways to bring about improvement or when other treatments will take significantly longer to be effective. 22 In reaching these decisions, the jurisdictions have given great weight to the vast and largely undisputed literature which asserts that medication is a very effective treatment for most major mental illnesses." But even here-where nearly the entire medical community From these four areas of law, it is possible to draw four general principles which seem to guide society's balance of medical interests against a patient's liberty and dignity interests. First, a patient should be deprived of his liberty only when failure to do so either presents a risk of serious physical harm to himself or others or prevents medical treatment which has clearly been shown to be effective. Second, a patient should be deprived of his liberty only to the extent necessary to achieve the desired goal. Third, a patient's right to choose among treatments should be protected wherever possible. Fourth, when a patient must be deprived of liberty, a set of strict procedures should be imposed to ensure that the infringements upon his liberty and dignity will be kept to an absolute minimum.
The law's current treatment of restraints substantially departs from these principles. Three reasons may be offered in defense of the law's laissez-faire attitude toward the use of mechanical restraints: first, that the medical benefits derived from their use justify the intrusion into patients' liberty and dignity; second, that the mentally ill do not have as great an interest in liberty and dignity as do other patients; third, that a strict legal standard governing the use of restraints would be too great an intrusion into medical institutions. A close examination of each of these reasons indicates that none warrants the law's "hands-off" policy toward the use of mechanical restraints. 307, 321-23 (1982) , the Supreme Court decided that the constitutional standard is an "actual professional judgment" standard. Existing common law restraints cases rely on a malpractice standard, which is also based on professional norms. See Annot., 8 A.L.R.4th 509, 512 § § 13, 15 (1981); 25 A.L.R.3d 1450 (1969) .
A. Casting Doubt on Treatment Efficacy: The British Experience
A comparison of British and American practices governing the use of restraints raises serious doubts about the alleged "medical benefits" offered by mechanical restraints.
The American medical community readily accepts the use of physical controls." American psychiatrists do not even see mechanical restraints as a "regrettable but permissible emergency liberty infringement. 3 1 Rather, in their view, restraints can be justified by one of two "medical benefits" theories: they are either a form of therapy (the "treatment" view) or a form of patient management, with medical indications and contraindications (the "management" view). 3 2 30. Although this Note focuses on restraints, and discusses seclusion and emergency medication only insofar as they bear upon the use of restraints, in discussions of the theory and practice of restraints, some reference will be made to the more voluminous literature on seclusion. Seclusion is different from restraints in some respects: it may be used for destimulation, and it may result in sensory deprivation. If care is taken to except these features, however, the literature on seclusion can be helpful, for seclusion and restraints share the important feature of limiting destructive behavior, and may be presumed to have similar causes and effects. Some commentators go so far as to suggest that seclusion and restraints are interchangeable, see infra note 80-not a position held in this Note. Moreover, restraints often take place in seclusion; thus a knowledge of seclusion is helpful to an understanding of restraints.
31. The Yale Law Journal Vol. 95: 1836 Vol. 95: , 1986 The "treatment" view 33 sees restraints as therapy for psychotic patients who are disorganized, delusional, and often impulsive. Restraints are supposed to calm these patients by reassuring them that they will not be allowed to lose control, 34 and are said to "give definition [to] disrupted egoboundaries."
3 5 The literature analogizes the restraining process to a mother holding her crying, kicking child until the child is able to regain control.
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Under the "management" view, restraints are indicated to prevent violence, to calm agitated patients, and to preserve the "therapeutic milieu."1 37 In practice, restraints are most often used for the latter two reasons. 38 Management theorists recommend that restraints be used at the earliest sign of disturbance. 33. Several commentators state or suggest that restraints are a form of "treatment." See, e.g., Straker, Guidelines for the Elderly, in USES, supra note 25, at 103. Nowhere in the literature on restraints is this treatment theory spelled out, however. This Note therefore borrows from the literature on seclusion, as well as from discussions with numerous professionals, to piece together the "treatment" view of restraints.
This treatment view of restraints is not new. In the past restraints were thought to torture patients out of "their madness," see THREE HUNDRED YEARS OF PSYCHIATRY 254 (R. wards are unlocked, and voluntary patients-the vast majority-are free to leave the hospital without notice.
48
That British psychiatrists so vigorously oppose the use of mechanical restraints, and that they care for their patients with little recourse to them, calls the American "treatment" view into doubt. Indeed, the evidence in favor of the efficacy of restraints is at best anecdotal, 49 and even proponents of the "treatment" view would be hard-pressed to claim that this evidence is anything like that in favor of psychotropic medication. If it is permissible to deprive a patient of his liberty for treatment purposes only when the benefits of the treatment are clear, then the "treatment" rationale for the use of restraints must fail.
The British experience provides an even stronger case against the "management" theory of restraints. British psychiatrists have found that mechanical restraints are simply not needed in order to manage patients and maintain the therapeutic milieu. In contrast, American "management" practice calls for restraints early and often, encouraging psychiatrists to act immediately rather than to wait and see if the perceived threat materializes.
Some examples of the use of restraints give a flavor of what the "management" theory will justify. In the first a patient is subjected to physical controls for repeatedly lacerating himself superficially to get staff attention; the "treatment" provided a "face-saving way to give up the regressive behavior." 5 0 In the second, a patient-never actually violent-is restrained for pacing more vigorously than usual. 5 Delusional material and affective response to seclusion directly represent fear, terror, anger, and resentment. In the art productions, patients presented a universally negative view of the seclusion experience when reacting directly to the event. . . .The nonpsychotic feeling of bitterness over being placed in seclusion was usually a prevailing attitude, even at 1-year followup, not simply an immediate reaction. For a few of our patients, bitterness about being secluded colored their entire perception of their hospitalization. Id. at 327-28. See also Soliday, supra note 32 (study showing patients have much more negative view of seclusion than staff); Chamberlin, supra note 32, at 288 (ex-patient reports that patients find seclusion form of "torture"); Plutchik, supra note 32, at 575 (study showing patients have largely negative response to seclusion).
50. Wells, supra note 34, at 412-13. The patient was secluded. 51. Confidential source in New Haven hospital.
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 95: 1836 Vol. 95: , 1986 restrained for being rude to staff. 52 The spoon-breaker discussed earlier could be cited under each category: as potentially violent, as agitated, and as disruptive of the milieu.
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Professor Wilhelm Griesinger long ago addressed the danger of the argument that the use of restraints is good and only the abuse is blameable. "No one," he said, "can say where the use ends and the abuse begins. .... ,,54
B. The "Lesser Liberty" Argument
The second justification for a laissez-faire attitude toward the use of mechanical restraints is that society need not weigh the liberty and dignity interests of psychiatric patients as heavily as it does those of other individuals. Psychiatric patients, the argument might run, cannot appreciate their actions in the way other individuals can. As a consequence, we should be less concerned about protecting their liberty.
This argument fails for two reasons. First, nothing suggests that psychiatric patients do not value and appreciate their freedom at least as much as anyone else does. 55 On the contrary, familiarity with the commitment (West Supp. 1986 ). Yet it is difficult to argue with the claim that restraints were used, not as punishment, but because the milieu was disrupted, or because the patient's "medical needs" called for the use of restraints (i.e. punishment will help him). The danger that staff will use restraints to meet their own needs (to punish or to manage), whatever the ostensible reason for the restraints, is noted even in the pro-restraints medical literature. Thus Gutheil & Tardiff, supra note 31, at 16-17, acknowledge that staff may use restraints or seclusion inappropriately to deal with their own problems-to avoid dealing with difficult patients, to engage a distant doctor, or to scapegoat. Binder, supra note 52, at 268, notes that seclusion, in his study, appeared sometimes to be used as a method of retaliation.
Guirguis, who disapproves of restraints, points out similar dangers. The habituation potential in staff is too great: restraints may replace more appropriate measures because they are an easy way to handle patients. Similarly, there is the potential for a more profound kind of abuse: "staff can act out their own conflicts by way of punishing the patient." Supra note 32, at 297. See also Strutt, supra note 32, at 1631.
54. 300 YEARs, supra note 33, at 1032 (quoting Griesinger's 1867 comment). 55. During the course of personal conversations, a number of psychiatrists have suggested that restraining a mentally ill patient is not like restraining a "normal" person, that mentally ill patients experience being restrained "differently" than would a "normal" person. Conversations with patients who have been restrained, however, strongly suggest that they are no less sensitive to the pain and indignity of being strapped down than any other person would be.
system, where patients confined involuntarily in hospitals strenuously contest their confinement, may well lead one to precisely the opposite conclusion. 5 8 Second, a standard of liberty based upon an individual's level of functioning would require troubling decisions about the weights and merits of the liberty interests of different individuals and groups in our society.
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Indeed, by protecting patients' freedom, society can, first, reinforce in these individuals what freedom they do retain, 8 second, give these individuals the dignity of making those choices they are in the best position to make, and third, reaffirm its commitment to the dignity and value of each of its members. As a consequence, the decision to restrain a patient, if it is to be made at all, should be made in response to his dangerous actions, not to assumptions about the relative value of his freedom.
C. The "Intrusion" Justification
The claim that the law should allow a liberal use of restraints because a more restrictive standard would be too great an intrusion into the medical milieu 59 fails for two reasons. First, medical regulation of restraints is often not even conceptually sound. Second, no convincing argument has been put forth that a new law governing the use of restraints would make institutional life worse.
We may be wary of intruding too much on medical practice because we think that doctors are best situated to know what their patients need. Thus, we hesitate to burden the profession with extra-medical rules which we fear will not serve patients' interests well. But we often subject medical practice to outside constraints in the belief that patients' needs and interests go beyond the purely medical. 0 In fact, many decisions to restrain (like decisions to commit) are not medical decisions at all. What degree or imminence of danger justifies restraints? Do the social consequences of mental regression justify re- 60. I have already discussed how patients must give their informed consent before being treated, and may not be civilly committed solely on the ground that commitment is medically the optimal course. See supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text.
straints?
61 These questions implicate acute moral and social values such as the importance of freedom and the rights of the individual against the group. The physician's superior medical knowledge does not vest him with a unique ability to make these collective, ethical choices. The questions are properly social, not medical, and the answers should properly be supplied by social mechanisms.
2
A second concern with intruding on medical practice within institutions is that it may have unpredictable effects, actually harming instead of improving institutional life. The success of the non-restraint movement in Britain, however, suggests that this fear is unfounded. Moreover, present rules governing the use of restraints 3 have clearly negative consequences in that they do little to discourage the use of restraints and much to encourage it. Current law credits doctors with predictive powers they do not have" and indulges doctors' fears of liability for injuries they could not have predicted. 65 As a consequence, current law actually encourages doctors to over-predict violence, and thus to restrain patients unnecessarily. 62. Naturally, the precise nature of the distinction between social and medical judgments is unclear. Still, one may at least tentatively call "social" those judgments about people that do not depend on esoteric knowledge of the body or mind.
For an interesting discussion of the distinction between "political" and "medical" decisions, see Gelman, Mental Hospital Drugs, Professionalism, and the Constitution, 72 GEo. L. J. 1725 (1984) .
63. Notice that with these existing rules we already intrude into medical institutions. Thus the issue is not whether to intrude, but how to do so in the manner best to protect society's and individuals' interests. 66. Restraints laws are so loose that liability for inappropriately restraining patients is almost impossible to prove. Moreover, most often the injuries resulting from restraints are dignitary; injured patients may feel it is not worth their while-or the publicity-to sue when an award for damages is not likely to be great.
It might be argued that the present liability scheme is sound, because we are more interested in deterring serious physical injuries than in deterring dignitary violations. But the harms to be compared here are the many serious assaults on dignity and liberty caused by restraints as against the rare physical injury.
67. 457 U.S. 307 (1982) ("professional judgment" standard).
interpretations of their own constitutions 8 are likely to follow the federal." 9 Common law approaches to the problem face a number of serious doctrinal and statutory roadblocks,
7
and are in any event unable to provide the detailed and certain guidelines which a statute can provide.
A. A Rigorous "Dangerousness" Standard
A new statute should use a high threshold dangerousness standard. Because the treatment benefits of restraints are highly speculative, a practice so restrictive and degrading as mechanical restraints is justified only in the face of imminent and serious danger. A new statute should therefore state that restraints are permissible only to protect a patient from imminent and serious violence to himself that there is a substantial likelihood of occurring. Examples of serious violence would be significant disfigurement, impairment of bodily function, or grave physical injuries which would require immediate medical attention. 
B. Distinguishing Between Restraints and Seclusion
The second important feature of a new statute should be to distinguish between restraints and seclusion. Of the two, restraints are the more serious deprivation, 2 and patients overwhelmingly prefer seclusion to re-68. The most powerful state constitutional argument against unnecessary restraint is that liberty is a fundamental interest which should be abridged only for compelling reasons-hence, not for speculative treatment benefits or in the face of minor or remote risks.
69. See, e.g., Note, Developments in the Law: The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARv. L. R. 1324, 1493-94 (1982) .
70. At least three common law arguments are possible: 1) the conventional argument that, absent an emergency, treatment without consent is a battery (but "emergency" can be interpreted weakly enough that many impermissible uses of restraints would be permitted by this argument); 2) a novel argument that restraints decisions should be subject to assessment by a reasonable person standard as to whether the injuries to liberty and dignity are outweighed by the benefits; 3) a similarly novel argument that restraints decisions should be assessed by ordinary battery standards applicable to restraint of the non-ill. All of these arguments could be undermined, however, by the fact that many states statutorily permit restraints for the sake of treatment or to meet patients' "medical needs." See supra note 25. 72. Different commentators and states have ranked restraints and seclusion (as well as emergency medication) in different ways, see Wexler, Legal Aspects, supra note 32, at 115-16, although some of these differences may relate to whether medication is used merely as a restraint or also as a form of treatment, whether the restraint is envisioned as public, etc. That reasonable people may differ does not mean that an effort to adopt a presumptive ranking of modalities is misplaced. Indeed, ranking these modalities is made easier now that we know of patients' clear preference for seclusion over restraints. See infra note 73. Doctors' arguments for a different ranking, in light of this preference, are unpersuasive. See, e.g., Soloff, Physical Controls, supra note 35, at 140, who prefers restraints to seclusion because staff can feel less fearful of contact with patients. See also Rosen and DiGiacomo, supra note 32, at 232, who inexplicably state that locked seclusion (or even locked wards) cannot be straints. 73 A patient in a seclusion room can walk around, do jumping jacks, lie in a corner; a patient in restraints can do nothing. A patient in restraints suffers the physical pain of forced immobility; a patient in seclusion does not. Finally, restraints are the more severe dignity violation. Nothing in our day-to-day routine prepares us for being strapped down, while being alone in a room-even in a locked room-is a part of most individuals' life experience. 4 Today, however, restraints are recommended, and are being used, where seclusion would do just as well: for danger to others, agitation, regression, and the preservation of the "therapeutic milieu. 74. On the other hand, patients restrained in public, but not secluded, can socialize with others. Observation and discussion with patients suggest that most feel too humiliated to do so, however. This point may be less valid when patients are in less degrading forms of restraint, e.g., restrained unobtrusively to a chair.
Consider further that being restrained to a bed would be impermissible punishment in a prison, because it is too degrading, see supra note 5. Moreover, 89.4% of the seclusion/restraints deaths in the N.Y. study were a result of restraints only. See Way, supra note 4.
75 (West 1980) . Illinois requires a two-day break-unless authorized by the facility director-after 24 hours of restraints, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 , § 2-108 (e) (1982) . In the case of seclusion the break is to occur after only 16 hours, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 , § 2-109 (d) (1982) .See also Tardiff & Mattson, supra note 25, at 144 ("Indications for seclusion and restraint were basically the same.").
This legal indifference to the distinction between seclusion and restraints is paralleled by a medical indifference. Some institutions show a clear preference for restraints, others for seclusion, but there is no evidence that the behaviors triggering the different controls are distinguishable. This means that in the former facilities, restraints are often (or always) used where seclusion would be sufficient.
In New York State facilities, for example, 53.6% of control episodes involved restraints, and 46.4% involved seclusion. Ten of the thirty one facilities surveyed used only restraints. Way, supra note 3, Table 6. 77. In addition to using restraints for danger to self, restraints may be used in three further, limited situations: a concurrent medical condition requires an unwilling patient to stay in bed; the medical condition requires an initial physical examination; or it requires physical monitoring more than four times an hour (for the doctor to be non-negligent). On the other hand, if a patient is too violent to be given a "mental status exam, then that exam must wait.
C. Allowing The Patient Choice
The third general feature of a new statute should be to give the patient a choice among appropriate control measures, and to require staff to respect his choice. For instance, to avoid extended seclusion (and loneliness), a patient dangerous to others might sometimes choose restraint in the company of other patients instead of seclusion.
It makes sense to give patients a choice among appropriate control measures, 7 8 even if the patients are of questionable competence, 7 9 because doctors have failed to make a persuasive medical case for any particular ranking of these measures. 80 Furthermore, patients are most likely to know their own states of mind and how the various measures will affect them. In any case, if no ranking can be shown to be objectively better or worse than the others, the patient's choice will never be wrong, and allowing him to choose intrudes less on his liberty and dignity than does imposing one control or another.
To maximize the role patients play in determining which control measure shall be used, they should be advised, on admission, of the advantages and disadvantages of each method. They should be asked to rank these measures in order of their personal preference. Any change of heart during an emergency, however, should be respected, and the patient's choice should be sought every half hour he spends controlled.
D. Procedural Safeguards
A new statute should also impose a series of procedural requirements to ensure that patients are appropriately restrained and are released once the requisite degree and imminence of danger has passed. First, a doctor should be required to renew her order for restraints each hour, after having personally examined the patient each time. 8 1 Second, every two hours 78. Patients dangerous to others should have a choice of medication, seclusion, or restraints in the company of staff or other patients. Patients dangerous to self should have a choice of medication or restraints in the company of staff or other patients. These patients should be told that medication may prove insufficient alone, but may be tried first at their request.
79. But cf. Note, Developments, supra note 13, at 1359 n.193 (desirable to give patients choice, but parens patriae patient's choice may be overridden if it does not comport with treatment program).
80. Doctors widely disagree on rankings of measures. Rosen and DiGiacomo prefer restraints, but admit the choice is "subjective." Rosen & DiGiacomo, supra note 32, at 232. And while Gair thinks physical restraint is, for some patients, too stimulating and diverting, Gair, supra note 32, at 16, Cubbin regards it as the preferred method, Cubbin, supra note 32, at 752. In the absence of a medically supported ranking, patients should be permitted to make their own choice.
81. Three states in the "safety or other rationale" category now require the first type of protection-the order must be renewed every 24 hours. One state in the "safety or treatment" category also requires renewal every 24 hours. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 51.61(1)(i)(1) (West Supp. 1985) . Six of the ten "safety only" states require the order to be renewed: Georgia every 24 hours, GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-165(b) (Supp. 1985) ; Illinois every 16 the patient should be released, and should remain out of restraints unless he makes an overt attempt to injure himself. 8 2 Third, every fifteen hours the facility director should be required to personally examine the patient, and renew the order for restraints."
In addition, there should be extra-institutional protections. At the end of 24 hours, a legal representative should be required to attend the patient (to inform him of his rights and watch him being released from restraints). At the end of 72 hours, an independent psychiatrist should be required to assess the patient's restraint in the presence of his counsel. If the patient remains in restraints after 72 hours, he should have a hearing before a judge, and should again be represented by counsel. . 1978) .
83. Off-unit review of the staff's decision to restrain a patient is uncommon, and, even then, often does not require personal examination of the restrained patient. For example, Georgia statutorily requires review by the chief medical officer, but only of a written report. GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-165(b) (Supp. 1985) . Illinois requires daily review (of some unspecified kind) by the director of the facility. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 , § 2-108(d) (1982) . See also Tardiff & Mattson, supra note 25, at 146 (nine states require off-unit review of some kind after 24 hours, three states, after eight hours).
84. The experience of New York, the state with one of the strictest restraints laws, suggests that, with adequate and frequent checks, prolonged restraint is minimized. Thus, in a one-month study in New York, most restraints orders were for four hours (the length before required physician review), followed by a large minority which were for two hours (the length before test-release). Way, supra note 3, at Table 8 . Moreover, 95.5% of the patients were restrained no longer than four hours, with most of these under two hours. Id. at Table 9 .
Nevertheless, the first two procedures are insufficient to keep restraints within reasonable bounds. Consider that 2% of the cases in the New York study were restraint episodes of nine hours or more, and 1% were episodes of twelve hours or more. Id. at Table 9 . Moreover, the figures are for patients restrained six or fewer times in the month studied. Patients restrained over six times were likelier to receive orders for nine hours or more (11% vs. 2%, id. at 4; 24% vs. 16% in one facility, id. at 5), and these individuals accounted for 39% of all episodes of restraint or seclusion. Id. at 1.
Connecticut provides examples of prolonged restraint as well. One doctor candidly acknowledges that he restrains patients, on occasion, for several weeks at a time (confidential source in New Haven hospital). Another hospital has restrained a small girl, whenever she is not in locked seclusion, for over two years (confidential source in New Haven hospital).
The last three procedural protections are therefore offered as failsafe measures, to protect patients from the prolonged restraint which now occurs, and which is legally permitted in many states. Only the first has even a rough parallel in existing law: IL. REv. STAT. ch. 91 , § 2-201(c) (1982) (notice to the "Guardianship and Advocacy Commission" if the patient desires).
The use of independent psychiatrists to review restraints episodes would be perhaps less costly than might at first appear, for some states are now adopting regulations on medication refusal which call for or authorize evaluation by independent psychiatrists. See, e. While requiring such an extensive set of procedures would be costly, 5 the hope is that the costliness of the procedures-as well as the high degree of danger required-will deter the use of restraints in all but the most exigent circumstances.
E. Liability Limits For Doctors
To redress the flaws of the existing liability scheme, a new principle of liability should be designed to deter doctors from using restraints out of a fear that malpractice suits will be brought. Liability should be strengthened for unreasonably restraining patients."' Doctors, however, should not be held liable for injuries resulting from a failure to restrain patients, unless a person of the most common understanding 87 would have foreseen serious injuries of the kind described in the statute. 8 This principle of liability 8 9 recognizes the limits of doctors' ability to 
85.
Note that while the proposed procedures are designed especially to protect against the prolonged use of restraints, all but the last should also be in force whenever the total length of time a patient spends in separate periods of restraint, within 30 days, equals the specified number of hours. When a patient spends 72-120 non-successive hours in restraints, a hearing should be provided only if his representative alleges an impermissible use of restraints. When he spends more than 120 nonsuccessive hours in restraints, a hearing should automatically be provided.
Note also that if a patient is claimed to have consented to treatment by restraints, he should nonetheless be seen after 15 hours by the facility director to ensure that the consent is genuine and competent, and similarly by the patient advocate after 24 hours. Patients are often said to go "willingly" into restraints when they do not resist, even if they have been presented with a show of force and given no alternative. The patient advocate should determine whether review by an independent psychiatrist or the court is warranted.
86. For example, one could establish some specific damages for violating the statute; these would have to be set not so high as to risk jury nullification, nor so low as to become merely a cost of doing business. Alternatively, one could raise a presumption of a battery for violation of the statute, to be rebutted only by a showing that extraordinary circumstances existed. Other ways of weakening liability for injuries resulting from failure to restrain a patient would be to put a cap on damages or to use a "gross negligence" standard. But the former penalizes doctors for proper behavior-i.e. waiting to restrain a patient until the danger is patent-and protects doctors for improper behavior-i.e. not restraining a patient when the danger is patent. And the latter misleadingly implies that waiting to restrain a patient until the danger is patent is negligent.
88. This is not to say that failing to use measures short of restraints-e.g. restricting a patient to a lounge, "specialling" a patient-would not subject a doctor to liability unless a person of the most common understanding would predict violence; on the contrary, an "ordinary doctor" standard would be used in such a case.
89. There are other situations in tort law in which the standard of care is lowered in order that concerns about malpractice not govern physicians' actions. The most notable is the situation covered by "Good Samaritan" laws. These attempt to encourage physicians (and others) to intervene to help a person toward whom no duty of care was owed at common law. Most such statutes hold a physician who so intervenes liable for injuries caused only by "gross negligence," or some similar form of misconduct. 342-46 (1981) ; Note, Good predict violence. It eases the pressure on doctors who may feel besieged by conflicting demands-both to protect patients and not to restrain them-by making a clear value-choice: Great numbers of patients should not be restrained in order to protect against the rare occurrence of selfinflicted injury.
Most importantly, the rule is designed to reduce both the use of restraints and the supervention of patients' choices. The fear that, if effective, the rule would cause a dramatic rise in self-injuries is unfounded, as may be seen from the situation in England. A serious increase in the use of other controls also need not occur: English doctors have not significantly resorted to seclusion or medication to compensate for not using mechanical restraints.
In America, a proposed restraints law may eventually have to be supplemented by a seclusion and emergency medication law. In the meantime, a new statute would spare some patients the pain of unnecessary restraint. Given the grave injury to individual liberty and dignity caused by restraints, that alone would be well worth achieving.
Samaritan Statutes: Time for Uniformity, 27 WAYNE L. REV. 217, 224-25 (1980) . The idea of such a lower standard, as in the case of the restraints law, is to encourage physicians to act (or not act) by lowering the risks of malpractice consequent upon their action (or inaction).
Consider also the area of constitutional torts, where an objective standard of qualified immunity limits government actors' liability so as to encourage vigorous decision-making. For the standard, see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). On appropriate incentives for government actors, see P. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT (1983).
